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11 Introduction
In recent years economists have revisit to the role of informal intuitions￿in eco-
nomic development. Literatures on this issue often deal with explaining the un-
derlying motivation and outcome of di⁄erent economic institutions observed in
agrarian economies by exploring problems of imperfect information and missing
markets. The primary focus of this trend is that informal tenancy market with
di⁄erent types of contracts emerge as substitutes for imperfect markets in an en-
vironment of pervasive risk, information asymmetry, social norms and moral haz-
ard.1 Among other things, recent works inspect the implications of factors such as
cash constraints, transaction costs and multitasking for optimal contracts.2 Hence,
theoretical researches advance a number of hypotheses on contracting that explain
the trade-o⁄ between own cultivation and tenancy cultivation and the choice of
crop share over cash lease in agriculture. These hypotheses include: optimal risk
sharing, optimal incentives, transaction cost, screening/ sorting and moral hazard
(Fukunaga and Hau⁄man, 2009). Among these hypotheses, recent attention has
focused on risk sharing and low transaction cost approach. It is important to
recognize that most of the outcomes draw from these models in the theoretical
literatures based on speci￿c assumptions. Hence, it is widely recognized that ex-
tensive empirical works are vital for understanding the generality of the theoretical
results.
To ￿ll the empirical research gap, this study brings together two separate
strands of literature. It provides the ￿rst joint analysis of decision to participate
and contract type chosen by both contracting parties by testing for all three main
hypotheses. This joint estimation method has an economic and econometric con-
tribution is that through this the sample selection bias can be avoided that plagues
studies on tenancy choice very often. Chaudhuri and Maitra (2001) use a joint
analysis, though their model depends on plot level data and includes only tenant
characteristics. The main contribution of this study is that it o⁄ers an opportunity
to re-evaluate the tenant-landlord contract choices. This has been done, ￿rstly,
by focusing on the transaction costs on the initial decision to enter into informal
tenancy market and secondly, on the e⁄ect of risk averseness of the tenant and
moral hazard problem of the landlord as re￿ ected through their attributes.
The empirical evidences in favour of above hypotheses are mixed and chal-
lenging. For example, Holmstrom (1979) shown that in the presence of imperfect
1Stiglitz, 1988; Bardhan, 1989; Fukunaga and Ha⁄man, 2009
2Shaban (1987), Allen and Lueck (1992, 1993, 1995, 1999), La⁄ont and Matoussi (1995)
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for e⁄ort. However, Allen and Lueck (1992, 1993, and 1999) use wealth as proxy to
represent the e⁄ects of key parameters on contract choice and conclude that risk
sharing associated with contract choice is not a major factor in North American
agriculture. They also ￿nd that the land lords want to minimize transaction costs
by minimizing problems of marketing of ￿nal outputs or by monitoring the tenants.
Their results contradict a common assumption of principal-agent models that the
tenants￿risk aversion is important to contract choice. Allen and Lueck conclude
that transaction cost, rather than risk sharing, is important in contract choice.
Ackerberg and Botticini (2000) provide a re-examination of the risk aversion in
contracting. Their works limit heterogeneity of the tenants to risk aversion and
of the land lords to the riskiness of the task contracted. In their empirical work,
they model risk preference of the tenant as an unobserved variable and ￿nd that
the land lord￿ s type of cropland and the wealth level of the tenant are correlated
with the tenant￿ s risk aversion. In related empirical work, La⁄ont and Matoussi
(1995) consider the choice of share tenancy versus cash rent versus wage contract
in Tunisia. They explain the costs of collecting rent payments under moral hazard
or default and imperfections in input markets. Hence, reputation, risk sharing and
moral hazard are important in their results. Hu⁄man and Just (2004), in contrast
to other contracting studies, consider equilibrium in the landlord-tenant relation
where supply of potential agents is larger than required to meet all contracts of-
fered by the principals. Under this assumption, competition among agents creates
an incentive for each principal to select agents with less risk aversion. In their
paper it reveals that both plot and the tenants attributes are key determinants of
optimal tenure contract choice.
Therefore, most of the empirical works focus on single hypothesis using either
the tenant characteristics or plot characteristics. While, in most of the developing
countries including rural Bangladesh, there is an indication that transaction cost,
risk averseness of the tenant and moral hazard of the landlord all these factors
may e⁄ect simultaneously on the informal land rental market . Consequently, it
is worth considering all of them. Ackerberg and Botticini￿ s (2000) works is the
￿rst one that test all three hypotheses. Their estimates suggest that moral hazard
and imperfect capital markets are important factors in Tuscan agriculture. Yet,
there is no signi￿cant empirical support that risk sharing played an important
role in contract choice. But their model also based on only tenant￿ s and plot level
characteristics and omit landlord￿ s attributes to contract choice.
So far, Rainey et. al. (2005) and Fukunaga and Hau⁄man (2009) are the
3only studies providing some support that attributes of landlords may also a⁄ect
tenancy choice. However, their results are somewhat unconvincing. this is because
the estimates consider only a group of landlords who lease out land and omits the
tenants who lease in land. Rainey et. al. (2005) use survey data obtained from
landlords who leased land to tenants in selected Arkansas districts. His results
shows that a land lord￿ s attributes signi￿cantly a⁄ect contract choice. Fukunaga
and Hu⁄man (2009) in their study also include both the tenant￿ s and the landlord￿ s
attributes but their sample unit is not an individual tenant or landlord, but a
particular contract between a tenant and a landlord. While very insightful, these
works do not jointly examine and compare the factors which may a⁄ect the initial
decision of farmers to participate in the informal land rental market and then chose
a contract. When arguing about the type of contract chosen, earlier works do not
examine the possibility that, there may be some situations under which a farmer
has to enter into the tenancy market as a tenant or as a landlord. Although he
may know that the outcome from the tenancy cultivation is not as e¢ cient as it is
from own cultivation. Most of the empirical literatures in this ￿eld focus mainly
on ￿nding determinants of contract choice assuming that the farmers already have
taken the decision to participate in land lease market.
A further question is whether choosing a particular type of contract by the
tenant or the landlord is driven by some endogenous matching. The problem
of endogeneity in this type of literature comes from the fact that in theoretical
models, there is no measurement problem regarding principal, agent and task char-
acteristics. However, in empirical models many potentially relevant characteristics
may be unobserved, partially observed or observed with error. In 2002, Ackerberg
and Botticini are the ￿rst one to argue that if principal and the agents with are
endogenously match with each other then determinants of contract can become
bias. For example, if the tenant￿ s risk aversion if perfectly measurable, then this
endogenous matching would be solved by regressing contract choice only on the
tenant￿ s risk aversion (Allen and Leuck, 2004). However, in empirical analysis usu-
ally proxies for risk aversion are used such as age, wealth or property. Ackerberg
and Botticini (2002) believe that using proxies for risk aversion does not solve the
endogenous problem. In their empirical analysis on data from Tuscan they ￿nd
strong evidence of matching between principal and agent. They use crop type to
check for this endogeneity and ￿nd that the tenants who o⁄ered a share contract
end up producing vine and the tenants who get a ￿xed rent contracts produce
wheat or corn. Following their works, Fukunaga and Hu⁄man (2009) consider
decisions on contract type and land type, with land type being endogenous in the
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tenant contract choice endogeneity of the land type leased is not a serious prob-
lem. Hence, endogenous matching surely is not universal for all agrarian economy.
Thus, there is this puzzle that whether or not farmers in rural Bangladesh also face
endogenous matching for contract choice. Through a separate model, to test the
endogeneity of matching, my study incorporates both the tenant￿ s and the land-
lord￿ s aspects together to select a contract type. This will help to compare the
behavior of two parties participating in the tenancy market in rural Bangladesh,
which will help for rational policy formulation.
As far as we know, this is the ￿rst extensive examination of these issues that
include all steps of decision for both the tenant and the landlord. Besides,although
tenancy cultivation is a very common feature of Bangladesh agriculture, there
is not su¢ cient empirical works on contract choices exist in rural Bangladesh .
Nonetheless, adequate evidence from empirical analysis is necessary for any policy
formulation.
About 73% of the 116 million people who live in rural Bangladesh depend on
agricultural activities for their income and employment. However, agricultural
land is a scarce commodity in Bangladesh. Per capita available cropland has
diminished by about 50% in Bangladesh from 1970 to 1990, which stood at only
0.08 ha against world average 0.27 ha (World Bank, 1997). Since land is in short
supply in this densely populated agrarian economy, access to land through land
rental markets has been important source to increase operational farm size. About
23 % of the total cultivated land is farmed under di⁄erent tenurial arrangements.
Furthermore,among the tenant farmers under di⁄erent tenurial arrangements, 63%
live below poverty line (World Bank, 2003). The most common form of tenancy
relationship in Bangladesh is sharecropping (bargadari), which gives the land lord
usually half of the production, while the sharecropper after providing all labour
receives another half. This system is usually known as adhi barga, which represent
half of the share. In some areas land owners receives a predetermined amount of
money for a speci￿c time period or crop from tenants and this is called ￿xed rent
contract. In few areas the tin barga (three shares) system has been introduced,
where production is divided into three shares against land, labour and capital.
The choice of land tenure systems for development has been a controversial
policy issue for many parts of the world (Otsuka and Hayami, 1992; Biswanger
et.al., 1995; Deininger, 2003). Bangladesh is no exception to this. Indeed, policy
discussions in Bangladesh (as reported by various organization such as Center
for Policy Dialogue, CPD, Grameen Bank, etc.) have been focused on the gap
5of information regarding informal agricultural land rental market. However, so
far Bangladesh does not have any success to implement any of its agricultural
land reform policies. Further rethinking and research is necessary to assess the
impact of this informal land rental market, which has been there for almost four
decades, for realistic policy formulation. Note that agricultural activities in rural
Bangladesh are administered by the Ministry of Agriculture, while agricultural
land issues are administered by the Ministry of Land. Unfortunately, no study in
recent years addressed role the of tenant￿ s and the landlord￿ s attributes in decision
to participate in land rental market and in choice of contract. This study examines
the landlord-tenant contracts in rural Bangladesh. To understand this, present
study focus on the contribution of explanatory variables (such as number of the
household participating in the tenancy market, the tenant￿ s and the landlord￿ s
wealth and working capital, age, education and sex if the household head, etc.)
that represent transaction cost, risk-sharing incentives and moral hazard problem.
Present study thus, is intended to investigate determinants of the share ten-
ancy in rural Bangladesh. For this study purpose both the landlord and the tenant
characteristics and some plot level characteristics are used. Econometric methods
used here are somewhat modest and some empirical results are not robust. The
￿ndings of the study support the presence of transaction costs in tenancy cultiva-
tion at least when the farmers take the initial decision to enter into the informal
tenancy market. Results also show that in general moral hazard problem of the
landlord rather than risk, represented by wealth e⁄ect, is the determinants of con-
tract choice in rural Bangladesh. Share tenancy are o⁄ered when the landlord
ensure monitoring of the tenant farmers. On the other hand possession of other
types of land among the landlords has a positive impact on the adoption of share
tenancy possibly because of their e⁄ects in stabilizing income from other sources,
thereby supporting the prediction of the presence of moral hazard. Conversely,
the ￿ndings are not in the line with existing evidence that sharecropping con-
tracts are more likely to be o⁄ered to poor tenants3. I do not have signi￿cant
support for wealth e⁄ect on risk sharing hypothesis through the empirical analy-
sis. Risk averseness of the tenant in this study is mostly supported by the tenant￿ s
own characteristics(such as age of head and other job opportunity). However, the
empirical results do have some support for endogenous matching in that share
contract seems to be chosen by the tenant and the landlord for a particular type
of land. In contrast to the survey data generally used in literature, the data used
here contain information on both contracting parties and thus provide a more
3See Ackerberg and Botticini (2002), Dubois (2002) and La⁄ont and Matoussi (1995)
6complete picture of the determinants of contractual structure.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: the proceeding section draws
ideas of imperfections in the land rental market and determinants of contracts from
the existing theoretical literature. Section 3 and 4 describe the data set used here
and the methodology respectively. Section 5 provides main ￿ndings. Section 6
presents discussion on extensions and econometric concerns. Section 7 concludes
presentation.
2 Conceptual Framework
This section summarizes three key concepts: transaction costs, moral hazard and
risk sharing.
2.1 Market imperfections and participants of land rental
market: Ideas from Theory
This paper focuses on the factors that may a⁄ect the initial decision of a farmer to
enter into the informal land rental market either as a tenant or as a landlord. In
the crop production, since land is an immobile resource in physical sense, other re-
sources have to be bought to it for agricultural production. The fact that in many
countries, many households participate in informal land rental markets clearly in-
dicate that the amount of land they wish to cultivate is not identical with the
amount of land they own or not own at all. Many authors, to date, (e.g. Bliss and
Stern, 1982; Binswagner and Rosenweig, 1984) show that with perfect market for
other factors of production, there would be no need for a land rental market to
achieve e¢ ciency in production. However, in the presence of incomplete markets
rural producers will try to maximize their utility from crop output by deciding
how to combine their own resource endowments with resources obtained through
the imperfect factor markets. This participation becomes more di¢ cult when the
farmers who participate are mostly poor as I see in rural Bangladesh. There-
fore, the decision of participating in the informal land market must have some
transaction costs. Moreover, the imperfections in factor markets together with
unobserved risk of production may create moral hazard problem for the landlords
who lease out land and may tend to make tenants, who lease in land, more risk
averse.
As mentioned earlier, in the agricultural land lease markets there are two
distinct groups of farmers. One group wants to lease out land hence identify as
7the landlord. Other group who wish to lease in some land are the tenants. At
the beginning of a cropping season, these two parties have to make decision over
whether or not to participate in the land rental markets. Very often this decision
is focus on completely di⁄erent factors.
2.2 Contract type: Fixed rent versus sharecropping
Existing literature of tenancy contracts armed with the theory of contracts usually
addresses two aspects: moral hazard and risk sharing. The landlord su⁄ering
for a moral hazard problem in which he can not monitor or verify the tenants￿
action. From the landlord￿ s side, it is always preferable to him to o⁄er a ￿xed rent
contract rather than a sharecropping contract. This is because output sharing
(share-tenancy) causes the market of land leases not clear as in the normal case.
The share paid by the land lord to the tenant does not always work the same way
as price. In addition, it is not always possible to fully monitor the tenant￿ s e⁄ort
in crop production. There are always risks of crop loss from many unobservable
factors such as ￿ ood, draught, pest infestation etc. Therefore, when the plot is
under sharecropping system, the low output may be from unobservable e⁄ects of
nature or from low e⁄ort from the tenant farmers. Hence, a landlord faces moral
hazard problems by the possible disincentive e⁄ect that output sharing may cause
to the tenant. However, for the landlord it is not always possible to o⁄er ￿xed
rent contract to all the tenants, especially in an economy where most of the tenant
farmers are poor and unable to pay ￿xed rent.
Similarly, a tenant￿ s ability to enter the rental market and to choose a par-
ticular type of contract may depend on the possession of non-land resources and
reputation of the farmer as a tenant. These are again characterized by his posses-
sion of sources of wealth and working capital that may be used to incur the cost
of non labour inputs. However, a ￿xed rent contract imposes too much risk to
the tenant because he is obliged to pay the ￿xed rent no matter what the actual
output might be. The poorer and risk averse tenants may like an output share
contract rather than a ￿xed rent contract. With a sharecropping contract the
tenant can share the production risk with the landlord.4 This implies decisions
taken by the land lord and the tenant may be di⁄erent and they may represent
the two sides of the market. Moreover, given participation as a tenant or as a land
lord, it is still possible that there may be considerable variations in the factors
4Theoritically, the landlord can mix these methods by o⁄ering a share tenancy with some
￿xed rent component. But in rural Bangladesh we do not see such mixed contract (Rahman and
Rahman, 2009).
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contract.
This theoretical model of risk sharing proposes three predictions that are sub-
ject to empirical testing. Firstly, because share tenancy can not fully motivate the
tenant to work, but reduces risk from the tenant, it is predicted to be adopted by
the tenant with greater risk aversion. Theoretically, income and assets a⁄ect the
tenant￿ s risk aversion. Practically, the tenants are thought to be more risk averse
if they have lower wealth.5 In this sense, also, having more opportunities of sta-
ble employment strengthens the tenant￿ s tolerance to risk and choosing ￿xed rent
contract. Secondly,the landlord will consider his capacity to monitor the tenant
when he chooses to o⁄er a particular contract. In this paper I empirically examine
following hypotheses using data from rural Bangladesh:
(i) transaction cost: the higher the transaction cost of participating in land
rental market the lower the probability that farmers will participate.
(ii) risk aversion: if risk sharing is important, then the more risk averse a
tenant is, the lower the likelihood that a ￿xed rent contract will be chosen.
(iii) moral hazard: the higher the marginal cost of evaluating the e⁄ort devoted
by the tenant to production, the larger the probability that ￿xed rent contract are
o⁄ered since they o⁄er more incentive.
3 Data and variables
3.1 Data and variables
The empirical study is based on cross-section micro-level data on farmers of rural
Bangladesh. The data collected from a survey conducted by the International
Rice Research Institute (IRRI). The sample survey is based on farm level cross
section data for the crop year 2000. The survey was conducted from February to
April 2000. A multi stage random sampling method followed for sample selection
from 62 unions in 57 districts (out of 64 districts, omitting urban districts). Then
one village was selected purposively from each union such that the population
density and literacy rate for the village are similar to those for the selected union
(this information was collected from the district census reports). A census of all
the households in the selected villages was undertaken to collect information on
landholding and sources of income of the household. At this stage two villages
were dropped because of the logistical problems of implementing the survey. The
5See Binswanger, 1981; Rosenweig and Binswanger, 1993.
9households were then strati￿ed into eight groups on the basis of four landholding
and two land tenure categories, and 20 households were drawn at random for each
village according to their probability proportion. The strati￿cation was based
on wealth ranking technique of the participatory rural appraisal (PRA) method,
because, the survey was initially conducted for a study of the impact of rice re-
search on poverty reduction in rural Bangladesh. Detailed information on land
ownership patterns, tenancy status and selected socioeconomic indicators for in-
dividual households was collected in this survey. The data set also include some
plot level characteristics. Model variable de￿nitions utilized from the survey data
are reported in Table 3.1.
Summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis are given in
Table 3.2. Although the average household size is approx. 5, the non agricultural
labour in a household is much lower than that of agricultural labour. This indicates
lack of other job opportunities in rural Bangladesh. Illiteracy is considered as
major problem for the economic emancipation in rural Bangladesh (FAO report,
2007). This is also supported by the data where Table 3.2 shows that only 40%
of the household head has access to primary education. The average age of head
of the household is approx. 46. Thus, they are of retirement age or close to it.
Among other sources of income, reported in the table, income from tree plantation
gives considerable side earnings.
10Table 3.1 Variable definitions
Variable Description
Selection model dependent variables
d_leasein = 1 if HH lease in land; = 0 otherwise
d_leaseout = 1 if HH lease out land; = 0 otherwise
Full model dependent variables
Type_leasein = 1 if HH sharecropping in the plot; = 0 if HH fixed rent in the plot
Type_leaseout = 1 if HH sharecropping out the plot; = 0 if HH fixed rent out the plot
Other binary variables
share = 1 if share contract
rent = 1 if fixed rent contract
Independent variables
HH characteristics variables
hhsize Household (HH) size (number)
total_worker Total active labour force in a HH (16-60 years) (number)
total_agri_male Total male agri worker (number)
total_agri_female Total female agri worker (number)
total_nonagri_male Total male non-agri worker (number)
total_nonagri_female Total female non-agri worker (number)
Socio- economic variables
edu_head Education of HH head ; =1 if completed primary education; =0 otherwise
healthyp No. of healthy population in a HH
sexh Sex of HH; = 1 if HH head is male; =0 otherwise
age_head Age of head (number)
prim_occu_head = 1 if the primary occupation of the head of HH is agriculture; =0
otherwise
cow_pp Market price of bullocks used in cultivation
Plot level characteristics
highland = 1 if cultivable land is high land area ; =0 otherwise
highl = 1if leased plot is high or medium high land
lowl = 1 if leased plot is low or very low land
own_irrigated_area Total irrigated area of cultivable land
riceplot = 1 if only rice cultivated; = 0 if only non rice crop cultivated; =2 if both
type cultivated
Wealth variables of the HH
homestead_land Ownland: homestead (ha)
garden_fruit_land Ownland: garden& fruits (ha)
pond_land Ownland: pond (ha)
cultivated_land Ownland: cultivable (ha)
Working capital variables of the HH
for_loan Amount of credit from formal institutions (tk.)
infor_loan Amount of credit from informal institutions (tk.)
goat_inc Annual income from goat rearing (tk.)
poultry_inc Annual income from poultry rearing (tk.)
Income_tree_plant Annual income from tree, other plants (tk.)
11Table 3.2 Means and standard deviation
Variable Mean Standard deviation
hhsize 5.69 2.501
active_labor 3.29 1.598


























12Figure 3.1: Distribution of landownershipgroups (data from rural Bangladesh, 2000)
1= absolute landless; 2= own only homestead; 3= functionally landless (<= 0.20); 4= marginal land owner (0.21 -0.40); 5 = sma ll
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of land holding groups (data from rural Bangladesh, 2000)
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Figure 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate distribution of land among the households in the
survey data. In Bangladesh households are classi￿ed into seven groups (mentioned
in the ￿gure) based on their ownership of land. above ￿gures show that in rural
Bangladesh only few farmers are medium to large land owners compare to the
huge amount of landless and marginal farmers.
4 Empirical methodology
The analysis focuses on the determinants of the decision to participate in the
tenancy market and of the choice between ￿xed rent and share cropping contracts.
13In rural Bangladesh (as elsewhere) social concerns and in￿ uences shape economic
decisions including participation in informal land market. Due to this social and
economic complexity, it would be very di¢ cult to estimate a truly structural model
of contract choice determination. As such, the current best practice methodology
when it comes to estimate models of contract choice is through the use of di⁄erent
binary choice models.
4.1 Econometric models: Bivariate two stage model
Decision of leasing in and leasing out land and conditional on these decisions of
types of rental contracts chosen are de￿ned as dichotomous latent variables. In
general, the study designates those who lease-out land as land lords and those
who lease-in land as tenants. Let us assume that these two groups of farmers are
distinctly di⁄erent with respect to their socioeconomic circumstances. Most of the
literature examining the determinants of land market transactions (e.g. Deininger
et.al. 2003; Teklu and Remi, 2004; Masterson, 2007; Holden et.al. 2007) also
implicitly assumed that the decision to lease-in and lease-out land are independent
of each other.
My two stage model is based on a tree structure of choice of tenancy contract
path. Farmers in rural Bangladesh at the beginning of the cropping season are
assumed to follow two sequential decisions. First, whether a household wants to
lease in or lease out land and second, depending on the outcome of ￿rst stage
what type of contract a farmer would choose, i.e. if farmers what to lease in some
land, then he have to choose between sharecropping in contract and ￿xed rent in
contract. Similarly, if the farmer decides to lease out some land, then he has to
choose a contract between sharecropping out and ￿xed rent out (￿g 4.1).















However, decision variables in each stage are likely to be connected and some
unobservable variables may a⁄ect both the decision. Thus, my empirical strategy
relies on ￿rst estimating two seemingly unrelated probit models. This allows us
to determine whether a joint estimation is appropriate or not (Maddlala, 1983).
These models allow us to correct for ￿ sample selection biases￿and is expected to
increase the e¢ ciency of the estimation. Finally, to provide additional insight into
the nature of the joint choices made by individuals, we calculate the marginal
e⁄ects of covariates on the probabilities of each combination of alternatives. The
marginal e⁄ect allows us to understand changes in socioeconomic characteristics
which may a⁄ect on the ￿nal four choices6.
The two ￿rst order conditions of the tenants and landlords maximization prob-
lem yield the optimal decision (q￿
1) and choice of contract (q￿
2) as a function of each
other and endogenous variables.
Assuming linearity , the model is,
q
￿
1i = ￿ q
￿
2 + ￿1i X1i + ￿1i (1)
6Results are in appendix
15q
￿
2i = ￿ q
￿
1 + ￿2i Y2i + ￿2i (2)
Where i = tenant or landlord and X1i refers to the observed determinants of
the decision of the tenant and land lord to participate in the tenancy market. Y2i
refers to the observed determinants of the decision of the tenant and landlord to
either choose sharecropping contract or ￿xed rent contract in the tenancy market.
￿1i and ￿2i are the associate parameters, and ￿1i and ￿2i are a random error term.
The data does not contain information on q￿
1i and q￿
2i. Instead we observe four
discrete variables. q￿
1i and q￿
2i are equal to one when a tenant or a landlord decide




















Yet, because the two decision of the tenant and the landlord are potentially
taken simultaneously and explained by some common determinants, the error
terms of the two models are might be dependent and distributed as a bivariate
normal, so that E(￿1i) = E(￿2i) = 0, var(￿1i) = var(￿2i) = 1 and ￿ = cov(￿1i;￿2i):
A Wald test for ￿ = 0 indicates these two stages should be jointly estimated.
Hence, the study analyses two models one each for the tenant and another for the
landlord and a total of four equations.
As mentioned above, in the ￿rst stage a household decides to lease in or lease
out land or cultivate by own. I assume that this decision of the household largely
related to his labour and non labour endowments. Furthermore, there may be
some e⁄ect of socioeconomic parameters of the household to make a decision to
participate in the land lease market. In this respect, estimates include several
household characteristics as well as socio economic characteristics; this should also
re￿ ect the presence of transaction costs for the participation in tenancy market.
The second stage particularly give attention to the factors that may represent
degree of risk averseness of the tenant and moral hazard of the landlord when
the two parties have to choose between share cropping contract and ￿xed rent
16contract.
4.2 Testable implications
The landlords and the tenants in this study chose ￿rst whether or not to participate
in the land lease market and then depending on this decision, chose between
following contract types: crop- share and ￿xed rent. In a crop share contract in
rural Bangladesh usually the tenant is responsible for all labour input but shares
the cost of non labour inputs and the ￿nal production output. A ￿xed rent contract
requires the tenant to pay the land owner a ￿xed cash payment and be responsible
for all operating expenses. As mentioned earlier, through this study we test a set of
hypotheses about the coe¢ cients of explanatory variables in the contract choice
equation, emphasizing imperfections in the existing markets, transaction costs,
risk averseness and moral hazard problems. I investigate the market imperfections
by using preliminary evidence from the data set. Following Tikabo and Holden
(2007) the initial test for the role of transaction costs in through the extent of
participation of farmers in the lease market and by using other parameters. Where
there are imperfections in the market or absence of trade, there is costs associated
with transactions in factor services, such as labour or bullock power or access to
irrigation. Thus the household having surplus labour (mostly family labour) and
/or bullocks lease in land while household with excess cultivable land in relation
to their factor endowments lease out land.
A number of proxies has been used to test the transaction costs and risk shar-
ing hypothesis in the ￿rst stage of the bivariate model. These proxies include:
household size, education, age and sex of household head, number of healthy pop-
ulation in a household and bullock power. For this, I consider the household size
as a proxy of household subsistence pressure (Teklu and Lemi, 2004). The higher
the subsistence pressure the lower the rate of participation in the tenancy market.
Hence, the likelihood of renting out and renting in land is higher among house-
holds with relatively less subsistence pressure (i.e. lower family pressure). While,
number of healthy population in a family may reduce the transaction cost in a
tenancy market. Accordingly, the rate of participation in the tenancy market in-
creases with the increase in number of healthy population. Age of the household
head use as a proxy for risk averseness: as the head of the farming household
become older, he become more experienced but less physically able to take major
part in the crop cultivation as well as supervising other family labourers. Thus,
he becomes more risk averse. Similar explanation can also used for education level
17and sex of the household head. The higher the education level of the household
head, the more productive the household become, the less risk averse he/she would
be. Also female household head assumed to be more risk averse than male headed
household. Since, she has a major role running the household and taking care of
dependents, it is traditionally assumed that female household head has less time
to take part or supervise farm activities than male head.
In the second stage, from the principal agent perspective we look into the
tenant￿ s and the landlord￿ s choice of contracts under di⁄erent observable factors.
Risk sharing hypothesis is tested mainly by looking for an e⁄ect of tenant￿ s wealth
and working capital on contract choice and some plot level characteristics of the
leased in plot. There is strong evidence that higher-wealth individuals are less risk
averse.7The tenants with more ￿nancial strength and the tenants who own some
king of usable land may have been less risk-averse and therefore more willing to
work under ￿xed rent contracts. In addition, considering the prevailing condition
of the rural Bangladesh, topography of the leased land can also be a signi￿cant
factor for choice of contract.
An alternative look at the hypothesis is the landlord￿ s monitoring ability. If
moral hazard and monitoring are important issues, female landlords or the land-
lords practicing non agricultural occupations or with more household members
would likely to have higher cost of monitoring. Thus they would not want to
participate in lease market. If participate would be more prone to choose ￿xed
rent contracts. Moreover, as noted in Rainey￿ s (2005) work, for the land lords,
their wealth, working capital and access to credit should indicate their ￿nancial
strength. Therefore, these variables hypothesized to increase the probability of
choosing a sharecropping contract. Access to irrigation is a major concern for the
landlord in rural Bangladesh to ensure a good production of crops. Thus, if the
land is properly irrigated, the landlord is more likely to o⁄er a crop share contract.
A few other control variables are also included in both stages of the selection
model to emphasize the key variables discussed above; for example, the type of
crop cultivated in leased plot and the type of labours in a household.
7Rosenzweig and Biswanger, 1993, provide striking results for India.
185 Empirical Results
5.1 Preliminary evidence
Table 5.1 presents an initial comparative study of the three groups of farmers: non
participating owner farmers, the landlords and the tenants. In the table, 39.5%
of the households lease-in land and 14.7% of the household lease-out land. Nearly
55% of the household take part in some kind of land transaction through land
rental markets. Therefore approx. 46% of the households are not participating in
the land rental market. One of the explanations of non-participation in the land
rental market is the transaction cost (Teklu and Lemi, 2004; Tikabo and Holden,
2004). Bell and Sussangkarn (1988) show that transaction cost would drive a
wedge between the costs and bene￿ts of tenancy as a landlord and as a tenant.
Non-participation of 46% of the households in the land rental market therefore, is
an indication of ￿xed transaction costs in the market. ,since in rural Bangladesh, it
is highly unlikely that all non-participating household have a perfect combination
of land and non land factors for cop cultivation.
The socio economic pro￿le of the participating farm households presented in
the Table 5.1 shows some distinct variations from the non-participating house-
holds. The average size of the cultivated land per household is only about 0.45 ha.
Hence, the functional amount of cultivable land per household is very small. Each
household consists of on average 5 members in the family and 2 workers/household.
In addition, the table con￿rms that 97% of the family are headed by male and
41.64% of the head of the household at least ￿nish 4 year schooling. Therefore, the
level of literacy is generally low among the farmers who lease in land and highest
among the farmers who lease out land. Looking at the wealth variables other
than own cultivable land, on average an individual household has only 0.06ha
homestead land, 0.04 ha garden and fruit land and much smaller pond area. Con-
sidering the source of working capital, a household earns on an average 3000 taka (
tk here after) from tree plantation annually, only 408 tk from poultry rearing and
negligible amount from goat rearing. Incomes from goat rearing and income from
tree plantation are lower for participating household than from non participating
household. It is similar for access to credit as well. Hence, income from other
sources such as goat, poultry and threes are higher in non participating house-
holds and landlords than tenant households. Similar picture can be seen in case of
access to credit from formal and non formal sources. The table indicates that the
tenant households in rural Bangladesh are the most disadvantaged portion of the
19society. This group of farmers who are leasing in exhibit many characteristics of
the rural poor in rural Bangladesh. Low asset ownership (land and other capital
asset, access to credit) and low education level. As these households have some
labour and non labour inputs that they can use for crop cultivation, the only way
to do it is through tenancy. In the table, 47.37% individual household only grow
rice, 47.18% grow rice and some other crop and only 5.45% grow non-rice crop.
Among plot characteristics majority of the plot under study are either highland
or medium high land or rest are low land.
Table 5.1 Differences in farm endowment, socio economic characteristics and extent of land transaction
by participation status
Variables Participating households Non-participating
households
Lease in Leaseout
mean SD mean SD mean SD
Percentage of transacting households 39.5 14.7 45.8
Household size 5.4 2.09 6.2 3.09 5.5 2.42
Healthy population in a HH(no.) 5 2.08 5.5 3.10 4.9 2.34
Age of head (year) 44 11.88 49 13.82 46 12.37
Education of head (school year) 2.9 3.56 6.06 4.6 5.6 4.38
Total worker in HH (no.) 1.7 0.99 1.8 0.97 1.8 0.98
Total male agri .worker in HH (no.) 1.32 0.76 1.3 0.88 1.3 0.87
Total female agri .worker in HH (no.) 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.17
Total male non-agri .worker in HH (no.) 0.72 0.86 0.8 0.80 0.74 0.78
Total female non-agri .worker in HH (no.) 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.26 0.05 0.22
Homestead land (ha) 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.04
Garden and fruit area (ha) 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.18 0.03 0.07
Pond land (ha) 0.008 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.03
Own cultivated area (ha) 0.22 0.43 1.52 1.50 0.58 0.73
Income from goat (tk.) 4.6 57.09 6.15 85.93 12 202.13
Income from poultry (tk.) 414.86 1005.37 503.94 771.41 327.81 510.02
Income from trees and plants (tk.) 1752.89 3175.51 6504.92 18040.45 1848.45 3551.37
Loan amount from formal lending
institutions
1678.47 3259.34 2389.74 5848.77 2460.57 7482.89
Loan amount from informal landing
source
1040.47 4645.64 2081.02 9618.98 1665 14128.7
2
Hence, the summary statistics presented in table 5.1 somewhat con￿rms the
accumulated evidence of the prevalence of imperfections in markets of labour and
non labour endowments. In rural Bangladesh, the market of hired labour is largely
missing. This may be due to the extreme seasonality of demand for agricultural
labour. The farmers relying greatly on hired labour may not have a guaranteed
20supply of su¢ cient labour during peak season. The same explanation is also ap-
plicable for non labour inputs specially, bullock power. Thus, for rural Bangladesh,
two inputs other than land that are essential for cultivation are family labour and
draft power.
Figure 5.2 Distribution of different household characteristics among tenants


























































Figure 5.2 and 5.3 present the distribution of di⁄erent households￿characteris-
tics among the tenants and the landlords and their correlations. Descriptively, the
21tenants and the landlords have similar size of households though average age of
the household head of the tenants is lower than that of the landlords. The tenants
have less owned land than the landlord. Thus, this data from rural Bangladesh
shows that marginal/small landowners rent in land from large landowners. This
contradicts with the ￿ndings of Fujita (2010) who study land mortgage in Tan-
gail district in Bangladesh and ￿nds that marginal/small landowners rent land to
medium landowners. In the ￿gures above I use the actual amount of land rent in
or rent out to estimate pair wise correlations among variables of interest. However,
there are no signi￿cant relationship among the variables . It is thus, interesting
to ￿nd whether this association holds when binary choice dependent variables are
use for biprobit models.
Before setting o⁄ to estimate bivariate probit model it is worth looking at
the distribution of two types of contracts (share cropping and ￿xed rent) in rural
Bangladesh, represented by the survey data used here. These distributions are
shown in ￿gure 5.4.
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Figure 5.4 reveals that, like most of the developing country, land transactions
in rural Bangladesh in 2000 are very much skewed. The average amount of land
landlord sharecropped out or ￿xed rent out is higher than the average amount
of land tenant sharecropped in or ￿xed rent in. The implication is that the land
22rental markets do not perfectly serve well in correcting factor proportion at the
farm-level (consistent with the ￿ndings of Taslim, 1989). Hence, there may be
other factors like risk averseness and/or moral hazard which a⁄ect the contract
choice.
5.2 Empirical ￿ndings: Bivariate model
Table 4 reports the results of ￿rst stage of a bivariate probit model which deals
with the decision of a farm household to lease in (tenant farmer) or lease out
(landlord) land.
First stage of biprobit model ￿nds out determinants which in￿ uence the par-
ticipation in land rental markets. I test this with same set of factors for the tenant
and the landlord households. As shown in table 5.2, there are some common fac-
tors and also some di⁄erent factors that explain the participation in the land rental
market as a tenant or as a land lord. For example, for both the tenant and the
landlord household, the bigger the size of the household, the lesser the probability
of a household to lease in or lease out land. As mentioned earlier, we consider
household size as a proxy of household subsistence pressure. Thus, household size
has a negative but diminishing e⁄ect on the decision to participate in land rental
markets. This also supports the transaction costs hypothesis. Similarly, when the
e⁄ect of the household composition is controlled (number of healthy population),
the e⁄ect of household size on the intensity of participation is positive. This re-
sult is consistent with the ￿ndings of Teklu and Lemi (2004) and Rahman (2009),
though Teklu and Lemi used the ratio of adults in the age category of 15-64 years
to the total household size. The model includes the number of total workers in the
family which also have positive but weak impact on participation in land rental
market. However, some literatures which focus on transaction costs hypothesis
claim that household with more workers will lease out less land and conversely
household with more workers tend to lease in more land. In my model, I do not
￿nd any signi￿cant relationship between number of workers and decision to lease
in or lease out.
To check for risk sharing hypothesis, the results reveal that, age of the house-
hold head has a signi￿cant negative impact on the decision of lease in land but
its e⁄ect on the intensity of lease out land is positive though weak. Therefore, as
the household head become old, he/she becomes more risk averse. Possibly, this
causes less participation in leasing market.
23Table 5.2 Stage 1: selection model
Dependent variables: 1 if HH lease in land , 0 otherwise ; 1 if HH lease out land , 0 otherwise































































* : significance in 95%confidence interval ; ** significance in 90% confidence interval; S.E. are in parenthesis
Similar explanation can be given for number of non agricultural male members
in a household who act as a landlord. This variable has signi￿cant negative impact
on the participation in the lease market as the landlord. The household who wants
to lease out land have to have su¢ cient monitoring capacity of tenant￿ s activity
to minimize moral hazard problem. This will ensure some degree of production
certainty. If a household has more members involved in non agricultural activi-
ties, this will lessen the number of member who can monitor his tenants during
cropping season. Therefore, this factor may decrease the probability of a potential
household not to lease out land.
It is earlier stated that number of agricultural labour and bullock power should
have signi￿cant e⁄ect on the decision on participation in lease market. However, in
the estimation although I have the correct sign but they do not have any signi￿cant
e⁄ect on the either decision of leasing in or leasing out land. Furthermore, bullock
power has a negative signi￿cant impact on landlord￿ s participation but the value
24of coe¢ cient is very small.
The second stage of the selection model allows one to examine how a household
decides over a particular contract. Conditional on the decision of leasing in land or
leasing out land, a household has to choose a contract between sharecropping and
￿xed rent. As a consequence, a tenant or a landlord has to choose to take or to o⁄er
either sharecropping in contract or ￿xed rent in contract respectively. I assume
that for the tenant the more risk averse he is the more he chooses sharecropping
contract. Similarly, for the landlord the decision to o⁄er a particular contract
more depend on degree of expectations over moral hazard and monitoring cost of
production.
For each bivariate probit analysis, I try three models. Model 1, which is the
base model here, includes all kinds of wealth and working capital variables a
tenant and a land lord can possible consider making a decision over choosing a
tenancy contract. Model 2 I accumulate working capital variable and includes
all wealth variables as before. And in model three I used accumulated wealth
and working capital variables. All three models also includes some household
level characteristics and plot level characteristics. Since a priory information is
not available on which variables e⁄ect the decision of a tenant or a land lord
household, estimation uses the same set of variables in both analyses. However,
one is expected to see di⁄erential in￿ uences of these factors on the decision to
participate as tenants or as landlords and select a particular contract.
The assumptions of wealth e⁄ect on absolute risk aversion for the tenant farm-
ers are quite popular in literature 8. This implies that wealthier farmers should
choose ￿xed rent contract more often than poor farmers. This follows, because
as wealth increases, the amount of exogenous risk the farmer is willing to bear
should rise. In rural Bangladesh, the ownership of any type of arable land con-
sider as a measure of wealthier households. The survey data set have information
on several types of land owned by a farm household. In addition, data set also
have the information on income of a household from sources except crop cultiva-
tion, which includes here as working capital variables. Although these data do
not perfectly measure wealth and working capital status of a household, they are
close approximations because farmers in rural Bangladesh tend to derive most of
their income from farm activities, and each of these variables measure wealth and
working capital is assumed to be exogenous to the farm land contracts we examine.
Overall as table 5.3 shows, for the tenants, the estimates do not give much
support to the wealth e⁄ect in risk sharing hypothesis. The biprobit estimates
8La⁄ont and Matoussi, 1995; Allen and Leuck, 2001
25for all wealth and working capital coe¢ cients, broken into components are in-
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero failing to support for risk averseness of the tenant.
Only for model 2 the garden and fruit land owned by a tenant farmer is positively
signi￿cant but weak.
The only three variables that have signi￿cant e⁄ect on the decision of choosing
sharecropping contract by a tenant farmer are topography of cultivated land rep-
resented by dummy for high land, non agricultural male labour in the household
and the age of head. Firstly, tenants cultivating elevated land are more likely
to go for sharecropping contract. The sign of this coe¢ cient is consistent with
prevailing situation of ￿ ood prone rural Bangladesh. Crop cultivated in high land
have less chance of destruction from seasonal ￿ ood waters. Thus, this assures
higher outcome than that of low land. Secondly, in the estimates, if more male
members in a tenant family involved in non agricultural job, they are more likely
to go for ￿xed rent contract. This may be due to the fact that non agricultural
job opportunity tends to give more household income security if a crop loss does
occur. Hence, tenants are willing to take risk if they have other source of income.
Thirdly, we ￿nd that, age (proxy for experience) is positive and signi￿cant. Com-
paring both stages we can say that: most experienced agent does not want to
participate is tenancy market. However, conditional on the agent participates in
the rental market, more experienced tenant farmer prefer sharecropping contract
than ￿xed rent contract. This re￿ ects the risk averseness of the tenant farmers.
In ￿xed rent contracts tenant farmers has to bear the whole production risk. The
more experienced a tenant becomes, the more risk averse a tenant becomes which
leads him to choose sharecropping contract where he is able to share risk with land
lord. In this regard, Maitra (2001) and Rahman (2009) ￿nd no e⁄ect of experience
represented by age of the head on the type of contract chosen.
Focusing on the other side of the market, empirical estimation on the landlord￿ s
choice over type of contract o⁄ered to the tenant re￿ ect the presence of moral
hazard hypothesis. For the landlord, the possession of more homestead land and
garden and fruit land increase the likelihood of o⁄ering a sharecropping contract.
This may be due to the fact that, possession of these lands ensure a raise in
total household income which makes the land lord more risk neutral in the rental
market. Similarly, access to irrigation on lease out plot decrease the risk of crop
loss and also increase the fertility necessary for crop production. Hence, it has a
positive in￿ uence on the decision to o⁄er a share cropping contract.
Finally, among the household level variables increase in female agricultural
labour in a landlord household decrease the probability to rent out a land under
26sharecropping. This ￿nding is consistent with the theory of pressure of moral haz-
ard as in rural Bangladesh male members usually responsible to monitor tenant
farmer￿ s work in the ￿eld. Some explanation of moral hazard can be applied to the
negative signi￿cance of household size means less time to spent monitoring tenant
farmers in the ￿eld which leads to decrease in the likelihood of o⁄ering sharecrop-
ping contract rather than ￿xed rent contract. Bullock power or agricultural labour
inputs seems to have no such e⁄ect on the decision to o⁄er a particular type of
contract to a tenant, though it is often assumed in the literature that possession
of own factor endowments by a land lord a⁄ect the decision of o⁄ering a certain
type of contracts to his tenants.
27Table 5.3 : Stage 2: full model
* : significance in 95% confidence interval ; ** significance in 90% confidence interval
variables Dependent variable : 1 if HH share in plot,
0 HH fixed rent in
Dependent variable : 1 if HH share out plot, 0
HH fixed rent out








































































































































































































































N 261 261 261 225 225 225

























W a l d  t e s t  f o r =
0 ; 2(1)
0.044 0.071 0.044 1.164 1.727 3.58
286 Model Extension: Analysis of endogeneity in
choice of contacts
6.1 Endogeneity in contract choice
In this study I also try the potential solution for endogenous matching between the
tenant and the landlord (explained in introduction) suggested by Ackerberg and
Botticini. Their suggestion is to use topographical or geographical based instru-
ments that can a⁄ect the matching, together with the tenants and the landlord￿ s
attributes together in one equation. The study estimates ￿rst the correlation
between the tenant￿ s characteristics and plot characteristics and then a probit
model which includes the landlords, the tenants and plot characteristics to check
for endogeneity.
A di⁄erent approach most literatures in this ￿eld is taken that considering a
situation where the tenant and the landlord have already decided to participate
in the rental market and ￿nally decide over the contract chosen. I also revisit
this methodology with data from rural Bangladesh. This estimation also helps
one to focus on any endogenous matching problem, if there is any, between the
land lord and the tenant. The e⁄ect of explanatory variables on contract choice
is estimating on the basis of the e⁄ect of variables on the probability of choosing
a particular contract. Thus, contract choice is a latent variable ,Cij, for contract










Where xi denote a vector of tenant i￿ s attributes, yj denotes a vector of land
lord j￿ s attributes and zij denotes the vector of plot level attributes. The random
disturbance "
0
ij re￿ ects the fact that this model contains proxies in xs, ys and
zs and hence contains approximation error. I assume that error term follows a
normal distribution with a zero mean and a variance of one.
The binary variable that is the outcome of interest, say, chosen sharecropping





1; if contract is a crop share
0; if contract is a fixed rent
￿
(6)





















Where F() follows a cumulative normal distribution function giving the proba-
bility of a crop share contract being chosen, conditional on the covariates. There-
fore, when estimating using a probit model, an increase of an explanatory variable
with a positive sign raises the probability that a crop share contract is chosen. I
consider the same hypotheses that has been considered for the bivariate model.



















Note: the ￿rst element in each cell is the mean wealth of the tenant and the
second element (in parentheses) is the number of observations (ref. Ackerberg and
Botticini, 2002)
The cross tabulations in table 6.1 show two correlations. First, highland plots
appear to be associated with share contracts, whereas lowland plots are most often
leased out under ￿xed rent contract. Out of 728 total observations, 445 highland
plots are sharecropped and 283 lowland plots are under ￿xed rent contract. Sec-
ond, as for lowland plots, the mean tenant￿ s wealth is higher under ￿xed rent
contract than under share cropping contracts. Though there are no signi￿cant
correlations between soil type and contract chosen. Moreover, from the table it
is obvious that there are no such correlations between the tenant￿ s wealth and
type of plot they leased in. Therefore, the next step toward assessing potential
30matching problems (suggested by Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002) is to examine
the correlations between observable the tenant￿ s characteristics and plot charac-
teristics. To address matching problem the observed correlation between the land
type and the tenant￿ s wealth and working capital variables inform us about the
direction of the unobserved correlations between the land type and the tenant￿ s
other unobserved variables. Table 6.2 addresses this question by regressing plot
type on the tenant￿ s wealth. The results reveal that there is no signi￿cant relations
among three variables.
Table 6.2: Matching equation : dependent variable ploy type
highland Coefficient Std. Err. t
wealth_t 0.0973457 0.164897 0.59
workc_t 1.07e-06 3.52e-06 0.30
_cons 0.7588444 0.0208043 36.48
These non- signi￿cant correlations may suggest that, there may be no match-
ing or may the estimation miss some important instruments. However, to make
sure about endogenous matching one has to then estimate a regression which in-
cludes both the principal￿ s and the agent￿ s characteristics together with plot level
characteristics.
6.2 Empirical Results: probit model
Table 6.3 below reports results of probit regression. Without controlling for match-
ing (without the land type and soil type variables), One can ￿nd little, if any, ef-
fect of the tenant￿ s and the landlord￿ s wealth and working capital strength on the
contract choice. after controlling for biases due to matching, however, empirical
results show signi￿cant e⁄ects of the above mentioned variables. As anticipated,
strengthening land lord￿ s ￿nancial condition (represented by wealth_l and loan_l)
makes the share contract more likely. Also, as predicted increasing the tenant￿ s
￿nancial strength (represented by workc_t) makes ￿xed rent contract more likely
though the value of the coe¢ cient is very small. The land lord￿ s ￿nancial condition
is the more statistically signi￿cant variable. Focusing on other variables, if agri-
culture is the primary occupation of a tenant farmer (prim_occu_t) is increase
the likelihood of the share contract. This supports the moral hazard hypothesis
in which agriculture as the primary occupation of the tenant somewhat guarantee
31increased labour e⁄ort in the leased land. On the other hand, similar to ear-
lier model plot level characteristics such as irrigated land and high land ensure a
positive outcome and thus, increase the likelihood of share contract.
As noted earlier, Ackerberg and Botticini (2009) in their paper mentioned
about the endogenous matching problem between a tenant and a landlord. Probit
results in this study suggest that these may be matching between the principals
and the agents. It does not tell why there is such matching. One inference can be
drawn that, under the share contract the income of the tenant moves in proportion
with the output realized. Crops grow in high land have higher output realized
than crops grow in low land due to the occurrence of seasonal ￿ ood. Therefore,
risky crop outcome is associated with ￿xed rent contract, whereas, the less risky
crops would be associated with share contracts. Interestingly, there are a number
of studies on contract choice that have found little or no risk sharing e⁄ects or
endogenous matching e⁄ects in various places and eras (Allen and Lueck, 1999;
Ackerberg and Botticini, 2000; Fukunaga and Hu⁄man, 2009).
32Table 6.3: Probit model: estimated coefficients for wealth effects
Model also control for agricultural male and female labourers and also for non agricultural male and female labourers in a
household
* : significance in 95% confidence interval ; ** significance in 90% confidence interval
variables Dependent variable : 1 if contract issharecropping, 0  if contract is fixed rent
Model with land type and soil type Model without land type and soil type
coefficient SE coefficient SE
Wealth_l 7.996* 3.164 2.669 3.705
Loan_l 0.00002* -7.10e-06 8.94e-06 -8.81e-06
Workc_t -0.0002** 0.0001 -0.0001 0.00009
Own_cul_land_t 0.375 0.928 0.298 0.883
Age_t 0.026 0.054 0.004 0.034
Hhsize_t -0.398 0.341 -0.328 0.214
Primary_occup_t 1.429* 0.450 0.507* 0.257
Edu_head_t -0.168 0.149 0.028 0.093
Cul_irri_area_l 5.669* 2.555 1.971 1.777
riceplot 0.281 0.695 0.247 0.639
highland 2.385* 0.719
Soil_type -3.114* 1.111
C -0.059 2.650 1.876 2.354
Log pseudolikelihood -9.553 -15.747




Through this study, I intend to contribute to the literature of agrarian tenancy
contract and landlord-tenant relationship with evidence from rural Bangladesh by
comprehensively considering the e⁄ects of transaction costs, risk sharing and moral
hazard problem. There has been a great deal of recent empirical work looking at
such issues jointly or separately in a wide range of countries: from historical data,
to agriculture in developing countries, to franchising and agriculture in developed
countries like United States and France.
33Results from the preliminary studies shows that in rural Bangladesh, although
more than 80% of the farmers line below poverty line, 46% of the farmers don
not participate in the informal land market. Substantial non-participation in
the land rental market indicates that there are considerable transaction costs in
those market. Results of empirical analysis showed that land rental transactions
are motivated by need to adjust land area cultivated to the size and number of
healthy population in the household.
Between risk sharing hypothesis and moral hazard hypothesis, estimates form
bivariate probit model strongly support moral hazard problem of the landlord.
Hence, monitoring capacity of the landlord are important factors to choose a
particular contract o⁄ered to the tenants in rural Bangladesh agriculture. The
landlords concern about their valuable asset, lease out land and participate in
land rental market when he can ensure a minimum level of monitoring capacity.
Therefore, household with more female labour tend to o⁄er ￿xed rent contract.
At the same time, a landlord will o⁄er a share cropping contract only when he has
su¢ cient other land assets, irrigation facilities in his lease out land and capacity
to monitor tenant farmers.
However, there is no such signi￿cant empirical support that risk sharing hy-
pothesis through wealth e⁄ect from the tenant side . Poorer and likely more risk
averse tenants do not necessarily work under share tenancy arrangements. The
empirical evidences from di⁄erent countries, though, suggest both similar and dif-
ferent conclusions. As noted before, Allen and Leuck (1999, 2000) in their works
also ￿nd no signi￿cant relation between tenant￿ s wealth and contract choice in
case of U.S. tenant farmers. Comparisons of their results to my results give some
contrasting conclusion. In rural Bangladesh, output from cultivation is largely de-
pend on favorable environmental , soil and land conditions. High unstable yields,
lack of income diversi￿cation and extreme poverty among farmers naturally make
them risk averse. Thus, when they decide between two contracts; share tenancy
and ￿xed rent tenancy, its their labour supply capacity and type of plot deter-
mines the choice of contracts. Results also ￿nd some con￿rmation of this from the
preliminary evidence as explained in the paper. Their major income and welfare
depends on the leased in land. Therefore, they may little option to choose a partic-
ular contract rather than to accept whatever contract and the terms the landlord
o⁄ers them. That is why, some degree of risk averseness among the tenants are
re￿ ected through their age, non agricultural income and type of rented land in the
empirical analysis. Furthermore, I do have some supports over potential match-
ing of heterogeneous tenants and land lords. Estimates ignoring this matching can
34give misleading results. In the analysis, controlling for matching gives a signi￿cant
estimates for risk sharing hypothesis.
I believe that these preliminary studies and empirical results are important
because there are evidence of the presence of imperfections in some markets in
agriculture sector in Bangladesh. The fairly high degree of non-participation in
the land rental market may indicate that there is room for policy intervention to
improve the markets and e¢ ciency of resource allocation. As a result, the ￿nding
of this study may provide insights into issues currently debated in Bangladesh
(also in many other developing countries) over the function of informal lease mar-
ket in substituting for imperfect credit, insurance and capital market. The land
rental market in rural Bangladesh is completely informal and has not been so far
stimulated by any policy. The analysis of this paper is still somewhat preliminary
in nature due to the fact that here I do not focus into that productive e¢ ciency
from a leased plot compare to an own cultivating plot or from a sharecropping plot
compare to a ￿xed rent plot. For a rural agricultural household in Bangladesh,
the ￿nal output of crop production which is also their main source of income, is
the main concern. This issue is missing from the analysis in this paper and will
be looked after in detail in future.
35Appendix
36Table A.1: Marginal effect: bivariate model: leased_in vs. leased_out
variables Dependent variable : 1 if HH share in plot, 0 HH
fixed rent in
Dependent variable : 1 if HH share out plot, 0 HH fixed
rent out

































































































































































































































Leased  irrigated land -0.155
(0.101)
-0.157
(0.097)
-0.170
(0.108)
0.062*
(0.028)
0.061*
(0.027)
0.067*
(0.037)
Soil type 0.021
(0.057)
0.024
(0.058)
0.026
(0.058)
-0.095**
(0.053)
-0.107*
(0.053)
-0.106*
(0.055)
Rice plot -0.014
(0.048)
-0.019
(0.048)
-0.017
(0.474)
-0.014
(0.040)
-0.021
(0.041)
-0.033
(0.045)
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